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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The paper draws a general framework for asset and default dynamics, separating the influence of 
the economic cycle into a component which is embedded in the rating system and an unobservable 
risk factor  that determines the movements of defaults around the ex ante estimated PDs. 
The two components – the sensitivity of ratings to credit cycle and conditional asset correlation - 
can be quantified through a Maximum Likelihood approach, giving a measure of the cyclicality of 
the rating system, and allowing  for a number of applications:  among those the modified binomial 
test proposed here. 
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1. Introduction 
A rating system should be able both to distinguish risk in relative order, that is to discriminate 
among credit quality of risky borrowers, and to quantify risk in absolute terms.  
How these tasks are fulfilled depends on the rating system’s underlying philosophy, which in 
practice cannot be either pure Point in Time or pure Through the Cycle but is somewhere in 
between these two extremes. Understanding the ratings dynamics is thus crucial in order to assess 
if the system is well functioning and if it is well suited to encompass for stressed economic 
conditions. 
Aim of this paper is to draw a general framework of asset dynamics: asset value is in fact 
influenced by systemic factors and idiosyncratic risk, the last one being specific for each firm. As 
far as the systemic part, which mostly interests us, is concerned, we can ideally separate it into a 
component which is taken into account, explicitly or implicitly, by the rating model, and an 
unobservable set of risk factors. Both components contribute to explain the default dynamics, but 
the first one also determines ratings dynamics, while the second one causes, together with 
idiosyncratic risk, the movements of defaults around the ex ante estimated PDs. This framework 
allows us to describe  cyclicality in a rating system as the ratio between the sensitivity to 
macroeconomic conditions which is embedded in the rating and the total sensitivity of defaults: if 
an appropriate tool is found to quantify the ratio, a rating system underlying philosophy can thus 
be exactly identified.  
Let’s in fact think about a pure Through the Cycle rating: no systemic component will be taken 
into account by the estimated PDs, while conditional asset correlations2 are maximized, as they 
should account for the whole systemic risk. On the opposite, a pure Point in Time system captures 
into the rating all economic conditions, so that conditional asset correlation are zero: realized 
defaults do not match exactly the default probabilities only because of idiosyncratic factors.  
The two components of default sensitivity can both be quantified through a Maximum Likelihood 
approach: the estimation technique is in fact similar, but as far as the part of cyclicality which is 
embedded  into the rating is concerned we used a multinomial model, while for the component 
which determines the difference between forecasted and realized defaults we estimated a binomial 
one-factor model.  
In order to quantify the internal rating sensitivity to the economic cycle we used in fact a transition 
matrix  approach: migrations among internal risk buckets are observed through time and used to 
estimate  an underlying single risk factor whose volatility can be interpreted as the named 
                                                 
2 “Conditional” to rating score at time t. Conditional asset correlations represent the portion of asset volatility not 
explained by the score. 
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sensitivity. It is in fact well known that counterparts under Point in Time ratings system tend to 
migrate frequently, in response to changing economic conditions (while default rates for each 
rating bucket will remain stable over time): the estimated sensitivity is thus bigger the more PIT 
the system is. This exercise is useful to understand where the internal rating system is positioned, 
in particular if compared to other systems and to agencies’ ratings. The same quantification was in 
fact replicated on Standard and Poor’s migration matrices, revealing a lower sensitivity of ratings 
to the economic cycle, which is consistent with the common perception that agencies’ ratings 
approach is Through the Cycle. 
The second component needed to quantify defaults’ sensitivity to economic conditions is the one 
which is not embedded into the ratings, or the conditional (to rating) asset correlations. We 
estimated them through a Bernoulli mixture model, maximizing the probabilities to observe 
historical default data for each rating class. The assumption underlying this conditional 
independence technique is that a single systemic risk factor influences, with different sensitivities 
for each rating group, all counterparts: realized defaults are thus independent from each other. 
Even in this case, rating philosophy matters: as we said before, in a pure PIT model asset 
correlation tends to zero, being all economic information useful to predict defaults already 
captured by score variables; conversely, a significantly different from zero value of asset 
correlation indicates that realized defaults will be correlated, as it happens in Through the Cycle 
rating systems, and that default rates per rating bucket will thus vary over time. An important 
application of asset correlation measurement concerns PDs backtesting against realized Default 
Rates: statistical tests generally used suffer in fact from an implicit independence assumption, or 
that PDs are able to assess the current state of the economy so that default events among 
borrowers may be considered stochastically independent. In the present document we propose a 
modified binomial test built on a distributional form for default rate which accounts for asset 
correlation: the test is less strict than the standard one, which would be appropriate only for a pure 
PIT rating system.  
As the two ingredients of default response to economic cycle (the part that is already taken into 
account by the rating and the one which determines default movement around rating) can be 
consistently quantified, an omni-comprehensive measure of the rating cyclicality which 
characterize a specific rating system can be calculated as the amount of the first on the total of the 
two. This has the advantage to range between 0 (pure TTC models) and 1 (pure PIT models), so 
that the positioning of a rating system can be immediately perceived: in the present application we 
found for instance a cyclicality of the internal rating of about 60%, far much higher than the value 
of around 20% calculated for S&P’s ratings. 
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The proposed framework, which is detailed in the next paragraph, describes cyclicality in 
sufficiently general terms. Paragraph 3 then explains the methodology underlying the transition 
matrix approach, which is useful to quantify the sensitivity of a rating system to the credit cycle, 
while paragraph 4 enters into the details of the Bernoulli mixture model. The following paragraph 
presents the results of an application of the proposed methodology to an internal rating and 
Standard and Poor’s sample, quantifying and comparing the level of rating response to economic 
cycle of both systems. Paragraph 6 describes one possible empirical application of the asset 
correlation values, which is dependent on rating philosophy: we suggest in fact a modified 
binomial test which can be more realistically used for validating a non pure PIT system. Finally, 
paragraph 7 draws some conclusions and indicates some next steps. 
2. A general framework for cyclicality 
Our analysis starts from the description of  the dynamic of one-year asset value , which 
derives from Basel II IRB framework and can be defined as one factor model
i
tA 1+
3.  
The following equations explain the main features of asset growth value, conditional on 
information set at time t: 
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i
tS  is the normalized credit score of the i-th firm, which depends on obligor specific 
characteristics  and on the macroeconomic factor : this is in fact the full set of information 
available to a bank for assessing the credit quality of obligor i at date t
i
tW tY
4. We assume here that  
and  are uncorrelated standard normal variables, and that, because of its idiosyncratic nature, 
 is also uncorrelated across obligors. 
i
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tY
i
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Equation [2.2] represents the asset process conditional on rating model information, where iα−  is 
the long run debt threshold removed in order to set the default status when 01 <+ tAit .  
                                                 
3 Capitol letters indicate the risk variables and lower-case letters the realizations. 
4 Even if banks do not usually include macroeconomic variables in their rating models, we argue that they are 
reflected in balance sheet and behavioral indicators; moreover, for the sake of simplicity, the stylized model splits up 
the effect of  the obligor specific part  from the common economic factor , so that they become independent. itW tY
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1+tX  is the “state of the economy” variable, or the single systemic factor common to all firms, that 
cannot be observed by a bank at date t. Conversely,  is the idiosyncratic risk, specific for each 
firm.  and are orthogonal, time independent and both follow a standard Normal 
distribution. 
i
t 1+ε
1+tX
i
t 1+ε
tAit 1+  expected value is t
i
t
i
ti ywS ,+α : the information set underlying the score, that is the linear 
combination of  and , can be thought as being  independent of both  and  because 
we assume that the rating model maximizes all available information at time t to predict default 
events in t+1 (or future asset values). 
i
tW tY 1+tX
i
t 1+ε
The factor loading cρ , assumed for now fixed for all firms5, can be interpreted either as the 
sensitivity to systematic risk or as the (square root of) conditional asset correlation: the term 
“conditional” refers here to the portion of asset volatility explained given all available information 
about the score  in t.  itS
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The above formula is used to calculate conditional asset correlation between firm i and firm j. 
Finally, it’s worthwhile pointing out that all the coefficients Wβ , Yβ and cρ  involved in the 
framework are greater than zero, being each risk factor positively related to credit quality; 
furthermore, we set 21 YW ββ −=  in order to grant standard deviation equals to one. itS
A value of cρ  near zero implies that, conditional on information at time t, defaults at time t+1 are 
independent because all the economic information useful to predict the default event is captured 
by the score variables. This is consistent with a Point In Time philosophy, that considers the rating 
model ( ) to be the best estimate of obligors default likelihood, reflecting all cyclical and 
systematic information. 
i
tS
Conversely, a value of cρ  significantly different from zero means that defaults are correlated 
among firms; rating score is thus not able to catch all systemic information at time t, whose 
residual and not predictable part will anyway arise in t+1 through . Two situations are 
consistent with a non-zero 
1+tX
cρ  : a “pure” Through The Cycle model with 0=Yβ , where  reflects 
only non-cyclical indicators, or a Hybrid one, which incorporates features of both TTC and PIT 
model.  
i
tS
                                                 
5 It could depend, as will be shown in the following, on rating grade. 
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In order to evaluate the degree of “pitness” for the stylized model described above, we need to 
introduce the concept of unconditional asset correlations: these can be interpreted as the 
correlations between firms when rating model does not include the systemic contribution , as it 
happens under TTC philosophy. Unconditional correlations should be larger than the conditional 
ones because in this case the rating model would be stable over the cycle, implying a greater 
volatility of defaults around unconditional default probabilities. 
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Equation [2.4] expresses unconditional asset correlation ( unρ ) in relation to cρ : it becomes thus 
very easy to prove the inequality cun ρρ ≥ . The level of cyclicality embedded in the rating model 
(τ ), which we have defined as degree of “pitness”, is the contribution of the variable  to the 
total systemic asset variance: 
tY
cY
Y
ρβ
βτ += 2
2
                                                          [2.5] 
In a PIT model, where cρ  tends to zero, τ  is near one, while in a TTC one, where cρ   is much 
bigger than Yβ , it approaches zero. 
FIGURE 1 Examples of rating system with different τ values. Each graph come from a 10 years simulation 
comparing average PD (calculated at the beginning of the year using the rating score) and DR (at the end of the year) 
for 20’000 counterparties. 
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Until now, we outlined a general framework for cyclicality. Our next task will be to quantify τ , 
through a building block approach: it considers separately the internal rating sensitivity Yβ  and 
the conditional asset correlations cρ  using for both a maximum likelihood estimation technique: 
 In the first step, rating sensitivity calculation is based on historical transition matrix: we 
maximize the migration rates likelihood among internal performing risk classes, relating 
them to a single risk factor whose volatility is Yβ ; 
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 in the second step, conditional asset correlations cρ  and long run PD ( )iα−Φ  (grouped 
by rating grades) are estimated using a Bernoulli mixture model, where the probability of 
observing the sample default rates for each rating class and sample year are maximized.  
3. Internal rating sensitivity through a transition matrix approach 
In the proposed framework, we assume that the bank’s internal rating model produces a score 
based on financial and behavioral ratios and grouped into homogeneous risk classes6.  
Let  be the score of each borrower which is, as it was defined before, made up by an 
uncorrelated and time independent specific part  and a systematic part ; at the beginning of 
year t, scores are grouped in G performing rating (score) grades. Following the CreditMetrics 
approach described by Gupton, Finger, and Bhatia (1997), we assume that one-year transitions 
between grades reflect an underlying, continuous credit-change indicator (asset) explained in this 
case by , a normally distributed “credit rating cycle” variable:  
i
tS
i
tW tY
tY
FIGURE 2 Illustration of Yt impact on migration rates for rating grade 4. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of a score initially in grade g (in the example grade 4). The 
score movement is caused by the common cyclical variable Y . On the x-axis, long run bins are 
defined so that the probability (assumed to be normal) that  falls within a given interval equals 
t
i
                                                
tS
 
6 The Basel II IRB approach requires in fact that the score values are mapped on a relatively small number of rating 
grades (at least seven non-default grades), but leaves their exact number at the institution’s discretion. This number 
will thus depend on the methodology the bank chooses for aggregating, such as cluster analysis (e.g. minimizing and 
maximizing within and between variance of potential buckets) or kernel density evaluation (in this case one could 
analyze the non-parametric score distribution and use the observed discontinuity points to assign firms to different 
buckets). However, the task is in any case to build a mapping function based on similarity rules, which classifies the 
score in risk classes. 
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the corresponding historical average transition rate observed for grade g. Theoretical migration 
rate  (from class g to class k) can thus be calculated in the following way: ( )kgkgˆ 1,, − tYSSP ,,
( ) ( )1,,1,,, Pr,,ˆˆ −− <<== kgitkgtkgkgkgt SSSYSSPP  
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This relation can be transformed into the following one: 
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where  and  are the long run thresholds which delimit the grade k range when starting 
from the initial rating g. Φ is the normal cumulative density function.   
kgS , 1, −kgS
Yβ  is estimated maximizing  the probability of observing historical migration rates, which are, 
conditional to migration probability as in [3.1], independent and multinomial distributed. The 
following equation indicates the unconditional likelihood of transition matrix at time t: 
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,  
is the total number of observations in rating state g and F is the cumulative normal density 
function of  factor common to all transitions. The first term of the product is called multinomial 
coefficient and explains all possible combination of  firms across all G rating classes, each one 
containing  (i from 1 to G) counterparties. From a statistical point of view, [3.2] quantifies the 
probability of an experiment repeated  times where  is the number of times (migrations) the 
different outcomes occurred with probability . The integral operator is used to generate all 
possible  scenarios over . 
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Due to the time independency assumption of , the probabilities of jointly observing all historical 
migration rates are calculated by the product 
tY
( ) ( )∏
=
=
T
t
tyy
LL
1
ββ  
which through logarithmic transformation leads to the Log-Likelihood (LL) function: 
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This expression, made of one-dimensional integrals sum, should be maximized over Yβ .  
Unfortunately, there is no analytical solution to this problem because the usual procedure – setting 
the first derivatives of the likelihood to zero – is not feasible; this expression is in fact tractable 
only through a numerical approach such as the gaussian-quadrature we choose7. 
To sum up, this method allows us to give an estimate of how much cyclical the rating model is: 
Yβ  in fact quantifies the sensitivity of rating scores to the common factor, usually identified with 
or explained by macroeconomic variables. 
4. Asset correlation estimation: a Bernoulli mixture model with rating effect  
Estimating (conditional) asset correlations is difficult in practice because of the historical data 
scarcity and the large number of parameters to be found. A natural solution is to impose some 
restrictions on parameters: in this case we used an exponential functional form for long run PDs 
and correlations, which in some way provides for the data span shortness. The method adopted 
here, called Bernoulli mixture model with rating effect, follows a maximum likelihood estimation 
technique similar to the one described in the previous paragraph: it determines long run PDs and 
asset correlations such that the probability of observing historical default data for each rating class 
is maximized.  
The main hypothesis here is that, once the  score has been assigned and grouped in G rating 
grade, it exists an unobservable systemic risk factor , shared by all firms and rating groups 
with different sensitivities, which allows for independence among all realized defaults 
(conditional independence technique). In addition, the G risk classes are homogeneous enough to 
assign the same long run PD 
i
tS
1+tX
( )gα−Φ and correlations  to all firms within a given risk grade. gcρ
In the remainder of the paragraph, we assume the historical performance data for the bank’s rating 
system to be available. For each one of the T years and G rating grades, we observe the number of 
obligors at the beginning of the year ( ), classified using a mapping function based on score  
value, and the number of those obligors that default by year-end ( ). 
g
tN
i
tS
g
tD 1+
Conditional on systemic risk , firm’s defaults are independent in grade g and can be described 
as the outcome of a Bernoulli trial with success (default) probability 
1+tX
                                                 
7 This approach, like other numerical ones, is normally solved by standard statistical software (e.g. MATLAB or 
SAS). 
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simply recovered analyzing and solving g-grade asset process in the following way: 
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where 
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gPD  and  are respectively the long run (unconditional) default probability and conditional 
asset correlation to be estimated. At time t, when  scores are properly classified, they determine 
the distribution of obligors across rating grades: consequently, the score variables do not appear 
any more in the process , but influence  in describing the distribution of defaults number 
and thus also  estimate. The g-grade number of defaults follows in fact a binomial distribution 
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Since defaults are also conditionally independent across grades thanks to the uniqueness of 
systematic risk , the joint likelihood 1+tX ∑ ++ =
g
g
tt DD 11  is just the product of the G conditional 
ones (Bernoulli distributions) defined in [4.2]: 
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The unconditional likelihood is thus calculated integrating equation [4.3] over all possible 
outcome of  1+tX
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where  is the normal cumulative density function. If we maintain the hypothesis that X is 
time independent, we can represent the probability of total sample default as in the following 
equations: 
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[4.5] indicates the Maximum Log-Likelihood (LL) function we have to maximize over  and 
 parameters, given the observed values of  and
gPD
g
cρ gtN gtD 8.  
Rather than directly estimate  and , we can express these parameters in a more 
parsimonious way, through a monotonous function such as the exponential. We propose in fact 
two alternative ways for estimating: 
gPD gcρ
 hp1: g  and c
g ePD ⋅+= 11 βα ρ  constant across grades as in the [2.2] asset equation; 
 hp2: g  and 
gPD depending on credit quality and thus allowing for a 
“rating effect”. 
g ePD ⋅+= 11 βα gc e ⋅+= 22 βαρ
In the first case, only three parameters need to be estimated: the intercept α1, the slope β1 defining 
long run PD and the conditional asset correlation ρc. In the second, α2 defines the level and β2 the 
relationship between asset correlations and long run PDs. β2 is expected to be negative, as 
suggested by both empirical evidence and economic consistency: to a higher borrower’s  risk is 
associated a stronger idiosyncratic component, meaning that default probability depends less on 
the overall state of the economy and more on individual risk drivers.  
In order to explore the reliability of the estimated parameters, we simulated their sample 
distribution through a Monte Carlo technique. The main purpose of the simulation is to check the 
robustness and significativity of parameters and in particular to test the hypothesis of ρc > 0 and 
β2 < 0.  A second issue to be analyzed is the entity of asset correlation (downward) bias, which 
typically occurs in small-sample estimation9. Assuming that the model is correctly specified, LL 
estimators will in fact be asymptotically consistent in the sense that the estimated parameters will 
approach the true ones as the number of T years of performance data gets increasingly large: 
unfortunately, in real-world applications, we have to deal with data span shortness, as it is very 
infrequent to observe a default dataset covering a sufficient number of years, particularly when 
referring to internal rating models.  
Thus, as there is no guarantee that LL will produce unbiased parameter estimates, it was decided 
to check the magnitude of the bias and verify if it can be considered as negligible. 
So as to perform the Monte Carlo simulation, we drew several historical default paths and 
maximized the Log-Likelihood function for each year, over α1, β1, ρc in hp1 and over α1, β1, α2, 
β2 in hp2. It was thus necessary to: 
1. specify a probability distribution apt to describe empirical default data: in this case, 
equations [4.1] – [4.4] with  LL parameters; 
                                                 
8 Also in this case we solved the integral numerically, as explained in the previous paragraph. 
9 This phenomenon was studied in many empirical works. 
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2. randomly draw a hypothetical dataset from the distribution specified in step 1: for each 
year, draw the time independent 1+tX  systemic factor, calculate g-grade conditional 
probability 1+t
g XPD  and finally extract the number of defaults from a binomial 
distribution where gtN  is the fixed number of firms at the beginning of year t; 
3. determine the LL estimators (α1, β1, ρc  or α1, β1, α2, β2) on the basis of the simulated 
data from step 2; 
4. repeat steps 2 and 3 several times to trace the parameters sample distribution. 
5. Empirical evidence: application of the methodology on an internal rating 
model and comparison with S&P ratings 
The dataset used to estimate contains about 61’000 Italian firms belonging to the corporate 
segment and covers seven years of defaults data, from 2000 to 2006. Each firm is evaluated 
through an internal rating model, based on balancesheet and behavioral ratios combined with a 
logistic approach: the output is a credit score, finally grouped in 15 homogeneous classes of 
increasing risk level built by cluster analisys. 
First of all we estimated the rating sensitivity Yβ  as described before, obtaining a value of 1.99%. 
The implied systemic factor  (“credit cycle”), calculated through the minimization of the 
quadratic distance between theoretical and observed one-year transition rates, shows the following 
trend: 
tY
FIGURE 3 Trend over time of  tY
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What emerges from the graph is a negative fluctuation in 2001-2002 (twin towers, financial crisis) 
and a positive economic growth in 2003-2004-2005 followed, in 2006, by a downturn which is 
likely to continue in the following years.  
TABLE 1 Hp1: Bernoulli mixture model in the case of asset correlations not differentiated per rating class. Statistics 
are generated simulating 5000 sample of 7 years default paths. 
  Estimates Mean Median σ Δ%Bias P2.5% P5% P95% P97.5%
α1 -8.121 -8.134 -8.127 0.223 0.16% -8.587 -8.512 -7.768 -7.712 
β1  0.433 0.434 0.434 0.013 0.20% 0.409 0.413 0.457 0.461 
cρ  1.299% 1.092% 0.957% 0.707% -15.97% 0.13% 0.21% 2.44% 2.86% 
 11.397% 9.884% 9.784% 3.385% -13.27% 3.57% 4.56% 15.61% 16.91% cρ
As far as conditional asset correlations are concerned, we present the results of LL optimization 
under Hp1, where a single cρ  is estimated. Table 1 summarizes LL estimates in the first column, 
and the statistics deriving from simulation in the following ones: mean, median, standard error, 
bias (defined as percentage ratio between mean and LL estimates) and some percentiles of the 
bootstrapped samples. 
Long run PD parameters α1 and β1  show a low standard error and are significantly different from 
zero: in particular, the slope β1 indicates that the rating model discriminates quite well among 
rating grades; moreover, the upward bias we found seems to be rather small and probably would 
disappear when increasing the number of simulations. cρ  assumes a low value and presents a 
huge standard deviation, in relation to the average, which anyway becomes lower considering 
cρ , or the sensitivity, as represented in figure 4.  
FIGURE 4 Empirical distribution of conditional asset sensitivity cρ , derived from 5000 trials of 7-years 
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As it is shown in the graph, the hypothesis of zero asset correlation can be refused, since the 
probability of observing a null value is about 0.4%. Furthermore, 2.5th and 5th percentiles are 
0.13% and 0.21% for cρ , 3.57% and 4.56% for cρ ; in other words, the independence 
assumption which would support a pure PIT philosophy seems not to be justified. 
The skewed shape of the distribution in figure 4 suggests the existence of a downward bias, 
mainly due to the historical data series shortness (T)10. It is anyway in line with the evidences 
presented in previous studies11, and could be taken into account through a prudential (e.g. 
13.27%) add-on on estimated sensitivity12, in order to get a simulated mean roughly 
corresponding to the value we think to be the “true” one. 
Combining the results for rating sensitivity ( Yβ ) and for conditional asset correlation ( cρ ) we 
obtain a value for τ , or the level of cyclicality embedded in the rating model, equal to 60% (see 
table 3). 
The same type of analysis was also applied on Standard & Poor’s data13, in order to compare the 
level of cyclicality of the two rating systems.  
The comparison is anyway not completely fair because of some differences in the dataset, as for 
instance: the data span, which, being for Standard & Poor’s much longer (from 1981 to 2003) and 
thus covering more than one credit cycle, is probably linked to a less stable default rate; the 
number of rating classes, as transition matrices were calculated for S&Ps on coarse rating grades 
(7 performing risk buckets). Furthermore, the internal portfolio is the result of customers selection 
for credit quality and of diversification strategies, which leads to a lower default volatility. 
The analysis on S&Ps data leads to a rating sensitivity Yβ  of 1.34%, while the following table 
summarizes the estimates for cρ  and the related statistics. We notice that the cρ ’s downward bias 
between simulated mean and estimate is lower than for the internal model, due to the longer time 
series.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This phenomenon is in fact negatively related to long run PD level and tends to disappear when the number of years 
T increases. 
11 See for instance Gordy & Heitfied (2002), Dullman & Scheule (2003), Demey et al. (2005)  
12 This is consistent with what Loffler & Posch (2007) suggested.  
13 “Special report, rating performance 2003”, Standard & Poor’s 02/2004. 
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TABLE 2 Bernoulli mixture model applied on S&P data from 1981 to 2003. Asset correlations are not differentiated 
among rating class and statistics are generated simulating 5000 sample of 23 years default paths  
  Estimates Mean Median σ Δ%Bias P2.5% P5% P95% P97.5%
α1 -12.175 -12.204 -12.193 0.389 0.24% -12.987 -12.862 -11.589 -11.468 
β1  1.570 1.574 1.573 0.052 0.27% 1.477 1.492 1.661 1.681 
cρ  5.205% 4.951% 4.788% 1.684% -4.89% 2.114% 2.472% 8.002% 8.750% 
 22.814% 21.923% 21.881% 3.802% -3.91% 14.540% 15.724% 28.287% 28.287% cρ
Table 3 compares the parameters for the two rating models: consistently with expectations, 
correlations are higher and rating sensitivity is lower for S&P. τ  - the level of cyclicality 
embedded in the rating model - is thus much lower for S&Ps data, with a value of about 20%.  
TABLE 3 Estimated parameters for equation [2.4] – [2.6] to assess the degree of cyclicality τ. Comparison 
between internal and agency models. 
 cρ  Yβ  unρ  unρ  τ 
Internal model (2000-2006) 1.29% 1.99% 3.23% 17.97% 60.51% 
S&P (1981-2003) 5.21% 1.34% 6.46% 25.41% 20.52% 
As far as the component of asset correlation is concerned, we estimated the parameters also for 
the second hypothesis referred to in the previous pages, or the one which considers asset 
correlation as negatively dependent on PD. This was done only on internal data, in order to use 
the results for the binomial test application. Table 4 summarizes the parameters values and the 
related statistics, while figure 5 plots the results for PDs and asset correlations. 
TABLE 4 Hp2: Bernoulli mixture model where asset correlations depend on rating class. Statistics are generated 
simulating 5000 sample of 7 years default paths  
  Estimates Mean Median σ Δ%Bias P2.5% P5% P95% P97.5%
α1 -8.172 -8.188 -8.127 0.246 0.82% -8.690 -8.601 -7.797 -7.730 
β1  0.436 0.437 0.434 0.015 0.27% 0.410 0.414 0.462 0.468 
α2 -4.179 -4.608 0.010 0.981 10.27% -6.652 -6.104 -3.479 -3.319 
β2  -2.433 -2.802 0.098 5.522 15.15% -13.620 -12.850 6.357 7.695 
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FIGURE 5 Hp2 estimation results. Long run PD compared with sample default rates using α1 and β1 parameters on 
the left, conditional asset correlation using α2 and β2 on the right side. 
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Applying α2 and β2 coefficients, we found asset correlation ranging from 1.53% to 0.95% (the 
related sensitivity goes from 12.36% to 9.75%); β2 slope is negative as expected but not 
significantly greater than zero (2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are in fact -13.62 and 7.6 including 
zero value).  
Finally, if we compare the level of the asset correlation with those settled for corporate risk-
weight supervisory formula14, we find that our estimates are considerably lower. Basel II 
corporate sensitivities, which depends negatively on PD and firm size, lie in fact within a range of 
about 35%-45%, compared to the internal ones that range from 9.75% to 12.36%. This strong 
difference is of course influenced by the fact that Basel II correlations are unconditional: however, 
even if we had used the internal sensitivity derived from unconditional asset correlation presented 
in table 3, we would not have joined the supervisory lower bound. The main reasons that could 
explain this gap are that:  
 Basel II correlations incorporate a certain degree of conservatism because they are derived 
for capital purposes and thus calculated at a stressed level; 
 the historical period for internal estimation might be too short (2000- 2006) so that default 
rates appear to be more stable than they would have been over a longer time window; 
 as already said, the internal portfolio is selected, thus showing better credit quality, higher 
diversification and lower default volatility than average. 
6. Backtesting hybrid PD through a correlated binomial distribution 
If up to now the effort to define and quantify the degree of cyclicality of a rating system may seem 
to be a pure theoretical theme, some practical applications of this exercise can be found in a 
                                                 
14 “An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions”, BIS, July 2005. 
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number of fields, like backtesting, benchmarking, stress testing. In the following we will just 
explore one among the different issues, i.e. the backtesting as a tool for validation.  
As stated in the WP14, supervisors and risk managers: “will need to understand how a bank 
assigns risk ratings and how it calculates default probabilities in order to accurately evaluate the 
accuracy of reported PDs”; “will not be able to apply a single formulaic approach to PD validation 
because dynamic properties of pooled PDs depend on each bank’s particular approach to rating 
obligors. …. will have to exercise considerable skill to verify that a bank’s approach to PD 
quantification is consistent with its rating philosophy”; “to effectively validate pooled PD’s, …. 
will need to understand the rating philosophy applied by a bank in assigning obligors to risk 
buckets”. 
The same idea that validation techniques should take into account the underlying rating 
philosophy turns up also in the Capital Adequacy Directive, where it is said that “credit 
institutions shall have sound internal standards for situations where deviations in realised PDs, 
LGDs […] from expectations become significant enough to call the validity of the estimates into 
question. These standards shall take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability 
in default experience.” 
Statistical tests generally used for backtesting, or to assess the distance between PD and DR 
(binomial, Hosmer-Lemeshow, and Mean Square Error), suffer from the independence 
assumption. They are in fact implicitly assuming that PDs are able to reflect the current state of 
the economy, so that default events among borrowers may be considered stochastically 
independent and so driven by orthogonal specific factors. From the point of view of the regulator 
(as it is for instance expressed in the Working Paper 14) this kind of tests go in the desired 
prudential direction: e. g. the binomial test is a one-side test, apt to detect if the ex ante PDs 
underestimate the realized defaults, but not a mis-calibration in terms of overestimation of PDs. 
Furthermore, from a statistical point of view this approach is very conservative in stating the 
distance between PDs and DRs. This framework can in fact only reasonably be used with PIT 
rating when conditional asset/default correlations are zero, while in all other cases the probability 
of rejecting the correct calibration hypothesis is higher than the “true” one. At the other extreme, 
there is the stylized TTC model, where unconditional correlations reach their highest level, thus 
maximizing the bias of the standard binomial confidence intervals with respect to the “true” ones, 
or those that would be calculated if correlations were taken into account.  
In the following paragraphs, we will illustrate an example of how the conditional asset correlation 
we calculated for the internal rating system (classified as hybrid) can be used to modify the 
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standard binomial test: the aim is to get the best-suited confidence intervals according to the 
cyclicality degree, even if we still apply a one-side approach.  
Generally, in the standard binomial test used for backtesting model calibration, we test the null 
hypothesis (Hp0) that stand-alone PD of a rating category is correct against the alternative (Hp1) 
of a default rate underestimation. This is a one-side test and can be represented, given a 
confidence level α (e.g. 95%), as in the following: 
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( )gindgt kDP ≤+1  is the cumulative binomial distribution of  future theoretical default,  is the 
number of firms in g-grade at the beginning of period t, 
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null hypothesis is rejected if the observed number of default is greater than or equal to . ( )α*gindk
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where  is calculated as in [6.2] but through a numerical integration method or Monte Carlo 
simulation
( )α*gcork
15. 
A further interesting method for backtesting is the validation of total default rate, also viewed as a 
joint test on rating class PDs. In this case, a copula approach is needed (usually called factor 
gaussian copula model), in fact, resorting to conditional independence assumption: 
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    [6.4] 
At this stage, the aim is to calculate the observed total portfolio number of defaults and then 
compare it with the theoretical  at a given a confidence level. Under the assumptions of ( )α*k
 
15 The latter consists in generating the variable contained in 1+tX 1+t
g XPD and then randomly inverting the 
binomial cumulative function to recover the defaults number (i). Through iteration of the process, it’s possible to  
trace the stand alone class g defaults distribution and thus determine ( )α*gcork . 
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independence or correlation we’ll call it respectively ( )α*indk  and ( )α*cork . For the latter we sketch 
the algorithm below: 
1) generate a realization 1+tx of 1+tX ; 
2) for each g grade, substitute 1+tx  into 1+t
g XPD  where g  and  
(table 4 parameters); 
g ePD ⋅+= 11 βα gPDgc e ⋅+= 22 βαρ
3) generate g-grade independent gcork  defaults from the binomial distributions (inside the  
[6.3]) and sum up the portfolio default number ∑ ;  
=
=
G
g
g
corcor kk
1
4) repeat step 1 to 3 many times;  
5) compute the whole distribution and calculate ( ) ( ){ }αα −≤≤= + 1min 1 cortcorcor kDPkk . 
Under the independence assumption, we adopt the same methodology starting from point 3 but 
with a consistent estimation of long run PD, using [4.5] without asset correlation parameters and 
thus removing integral treatment16. This slightly different PD calibration is also applied to stand-
alone test. 
Next step is to build a real case study in order to compare standard binomial with binomial test 
accounting for estimated correlations. For the purpose of illustration, we propose a realistic 
corporate portfolio at year t composed by 16’000 firms, with the following rating and t+1 defaults 
distribution: 
FIGURE 6 Corporate rating distribution at the beginning of year t (left y axis) and 
observed defaults (right axis).  
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16 This estimation leads to α1=-8.025, β1=0.429 and LL(D)=-258.41 while in table 4 we found α1=-8.172, β1=0.436 
and LL(D)=-228.43. As we expected, the performance expressed by log-likelihood  is lower although we observe a 
slight increase in long run PD; this is essentially due to the fatter tail of default distribution when estimation is 
conducted under asset correlation assumption, implying a decrease in the mean value. 
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Average PD calculated under correlation assumption (table 4 parameters) is 2.36%, whereas the 
average PD in the case of asset independency is 2.50% (the two values are different as PDs are 
endogenously estimated according to different calibrations). Figure 7 outlines the difference in 
shape between simulated stand-alone default rate distribution for some rating classes (classes 5-8-
10-15), according to the two assumptions (thus of the using [6.1] and [6.3] with 500’000 trials): 
FIGURE 7 Comparison between independent (blue) and correlated (red) binomial default rate distribution. 
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Furthermore, next figure compares in the same way the portfolio default distribution we traced 
according to the above explained algorithm for copula implementation: 
FIGURE 8 Comparison between independent (blue) and correlated (red) portfolio default rate distribution. 
  
When the whole default distribution is calculated, the granularity-effect, related to the 
independency assumption and due to the compensation of specific risk among risk grades, is 
stronger: this can be noticed in the shape of the blue distribution, which is more compressed 
around its mean than in the single class cases.          
Since our intention is to evaluate the reasonability of PD forecast, we build table 5, where 
observed default rates (DR) are compared to the 95th and the 99th percentiles of  the theoretical 
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distribution: in the right part of the table, statistics are based on the estimated coefficients shown 
in table 4 for Bernoulli mixture model, while in the left one binomial distributions without 
correlation assumption are computed for comparison. In the last row, figures refer to the whole 
portfolio distribution. 
TABLE 5 Summary statistics on defaults rates distributions under different correlation assumptions. To make 
comparison homogeneous, all numbers are computed by Monte Carlo simulation with 500’000 draws. 
  Binomial distribution with no correlations Binomial distribution with correlations 
Rating DR Mean Median 
( )
g
t
g
ind
N
k %95*  ( )
g
t
g
ind
N
k %99* p-value 
(DR) Mean Median 
( )
g
t
g
cor
N
k %95*  ( )
g
t
g
cor
N
k %99*  p-value 
(DR) 
1 0.206% 0.050% 0.000% 0.206% 0.412% 2.55% 0.044% 0.000% 0.206% 0.412% 2.25% 
2 0.943% 0.077% 0.000% 0.377% 0.377% 0.00% 0.068% 0.000% 0.377% 0.377% 0.00% 
3 0.000% 0.118% 0.157% 0.314% 0.472% 52.90% 0.104% 0.000% 0.314% 0.472% 46.60% 
4 0.769% 0.181% 0.154% 0.462% 0.615% 0.14% 0.162% 0.154% 0.462% 0.615% 0.26% 
5 1.176% 0.279% 0.235% 0.588% 0.824% 68.60% 0.250% 0.235% 0.588% 0.824% 58.76% 
6 0.316% 0.428% 0.421% 0.842% 0.947% 57.98% 0.388% 0.316% 0.842% 1.158% 46.97% 
7 0.923% 0.657% 0.692% 1.000% 1.154% 8.70% 0.599% 0.538% 1.154% 1.462% 11.69% 
8 0.778% 1.008% 1.000% 1.389% 1.556% 80.42% 0.926% 0.889% 1.611% 2.056% 58.25% 
9 2.045% 1.548% 1.545% 2.000% 2.182% 2.42% 1.432% 1.364% 2.364% 2.909% 11.31% 
10 3.017% 2.377% 2.396% 2.884% 3.106% 1.97% 2.215% 2.130% 3.505% 4.259% 12.64% 
11 4.494% 3.648% 3.628% 4.385% 4.656% 2.28% 3.427% 3.303% 5.252% 6.226% 13.75% 
12 5.109% 5.600% 5.620% 6.642% 7.080% 76.75% 5.298% 5.182% 7.810% 9.124% 50.39% 
13 8.449% 8.596% 8.602% 10.445% 11.214% 52.50% 8.195% 7.988% 11.674% 13.518% 40.79% 
14 12.500% 13.190% 13.214% 16.429% 18.214% 59.11% 12.674% 12.500% 17.857% 20.357% 47.72% 
15 21.429% 20.256% 20.408% 25.000% 27.041% 30.46% 19.603% 19.388% 26.531% 29.592% 28.77% 
TOT 2.800% 2.500% 2.500% 2.700% 2.781% 0.62% 2.357% 2.300% 3.425% 4.006% 20.92% 
Looking at stand alone rating class, the standard binomial test would reject the hypothesis of 
correct calibration for seven grades (1,2,4,5,9,10,11)  at 95% confidence level and for three grades 
(2,4,5) at 99%. We are facing a situation slightly less conservative when we introduce correlation 
parameters, because the test rejects the null for four grades (1,2,4,5) at 95% and for two grades 
(2,4) at 99%. However, the most relevant difference concerns the test performed on the entire 
portfolio: here, as far as default independency is concerned, we would not accept the bank’s 
forecast as adequate because the probability to observe a default rate greater than 2.8% is only 
0.62% (“p-value DR” in table 5). This probability becomes much less extreme in the case of asset 
dependency (20.92%), suggesting that the model and the calibration are not yet to be revised. This 
remark is deemed convincing only if a bank can explain somehow the dependency structure of its 
portfolio, for example by statistical evidence based on historical defaults, as we did. If in such a 
situation the standard binomial test was applied, the proper size of type I errors (rejection of the 
null hypothesis when it is true) would be higher than the α-level of confidence indicated by  the 
test. 
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7. Conclusion 
The paper presents a general framework of asset and default dynamics, which separates the 
cyclicality effect into a component which is embedded into the rating system and another one 
which explains the fluctuation of realized defaults around the ex-ante calculated probability of 
default. This framework allows us to detect the point where the rating system is situated in 
between the two purely theoretical extremes of Point In Time and Through The Cycle. 
Understanding and quantifying the philosophy which characterizes a system, and the implied 
rating dynamics, is crucial for a number of issues, like validation, pricing, stress testing, economic 
and regulatory capital. In this paper some results were presented regarding validation, and 
specifically a method to estimate asset correlations was suggested which can be usefully applied 
by banks to modify the standard tests that suffer from independence assumption.  
Still there are applications to other fields that can benefit from the cyclicality framework we 
sketched and that are still to be explored. As far as migration analysis is concerned, it is directly 
applicable  to stress testing: in the proposed framework the cyclical (systemic) variable is not 
identified, so that scenarios can only be expressed in terms of percentiles. Further work could 
anyway go in the direction of explaining this factor, at least partially, by macroeconomic 
variables, in order to better understand its contribution and to describe expected scenarios. A 
foreseeable problem in this case could be the shortness of the historical series of internal 
migrations, which doesn’t guarantee the necessary robustness of the estimated relationship 
between macro variables and the implicit cyclical factor.  
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